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Mainstream international trade law scholars have commented positively on the work 
of WTO adjudicators.  This favorable view is both echoed and challenged by 
empirical scholarship that shows a high disparity between Complainant and 
Respondent success rates (Complainants win between 80 and 90 percent of the 
disputes).  Regardless of how one interprets these results, mainstream theorists, 
especially legalists, believe more is to be done to strengthen the system, and they 
point to instances of member recalcitrance to implement rulings as a serious problem.  
This article posits that such attempts to strengthen compliance are ill-advised.  After 
discussing prior empirical analyses of WTO adjudication involving primary rights 
and obligations under the WTO agreements (i.e., substantive adjudication), this 
article expands the empirical study into compliance disputes.  It finds that 
"enforcement" proceedings do protect the pro-free trade interests so overwhelmingly 
supported in substantive adjudication.  Because that is the case, this article 
investigates the extent to which current levels of noncompliance might constitute a 
threat to this regime, and theorizes that the observed level is not only acceptable but a 
necessary feature of the system.  I conclude by arguing that compliance-related issues 
must be viewed in a broader perspective that transcends narrow legalistic views and 
accounts for the multifaceted interests of, and differences among, WTO members.  
(JEL: K 33, K 41) 
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Mainstream international trade law scholars characterize the WTO dispute 
settlement system's handling of cases as one of the most striking successes of the post-
Uruguay Round legacy.1  To them, judicialization of trade disputes and the "apt" work 
of WTO adjudicators in handling this caseload have increased the normative strength of 
the negotiated agreements and furthered the status of international trade as a rules-based 
regime.  This favorable view is both echoed and challenged by empirical scholarship 
that shows a high disparity between Complainant and Respondent success rates 
(Complainants win between 80 to 90 percent of the disputes) in WTO litigation.2  The 
more recent empirical study eliminated case docket differences (e.g., case subject 
matter, party status, income level and other litigant-specific characteristics), case 
selection and other alternative hypotheses as potential explanations for this divergence.  
It theorized that this discrepancy in success rates is the result of a systematic, one-sided 
readiness on the part of WTO adjudicators to construe WTO texts as creating 
obligations against Respondents, often in disregard of members' reserved regulatory 
competencies and the negotiated standards of review.3   
                                                 
† The author is grateful to __________and ________ for their helpful suggestions, which 
greatly assisted the author's research.  Melissa Palmer provided excellent research assistance. 
This article was presented at the ASIL – International Law Group Biennial Conference at the 
University of Minnesota Law School (November 18-20, 2010).   
1 See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of 
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996).   
2 See, e.g., John Maton & Carolyn Maton, Independence Under Fire: Extra-Legal 
Pressures and Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 317 
(2007) (praising the DSB system as "independent from Member State influence."); Juscelino 
F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule 
Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 383, 439 (2009) (faulting the DSB system for 
embracing an expansive form of judicial lawmaking that "consistently construes WTO law 
against Respondents" in substantive adjudication). 
3 Id. at 429.   
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR'S PERMISSION DRAFT OF FEB. 3, 2010 (SC) 
 - 3 - 
Still, regardless of how one interprets these results, mainstream theorists believe 
more is to be done to strengthen the system, and they point to instances of member 
recalcitrance to implement DSB recommendations as a serious problem.4  To this end, 
they propose reforms ranging from allowing for collective sanctions through 
multilateral enforcement to tightening enforcement deadlines so as to increase the 
incentives for compliance.  This article posits that such attempts to strengthen 
compliance are ill-advised.  First, the case for a compliance problem is weak: 
suspension of concessions seldom occurs, as Respondents tend to comply after losing 
the underlying case or following defeat in a compliance case.  Furthermore, the rare 
instances of noncompliance after litigation has run its full course do not deprive 
successful Complainants of all they can expect to gain from litigating.  Beyond 
allowing for the redress of grievances, litigation can also give Complainants advantages 
in ongoing trade negotiations.5  Second, enforcement-enhancing proposals are premised 
on the notion that giving more power to third-parties charged with resolving disputes 
and monitoring enforcement will necessarily strengthen the normative obligations 
already prescribed in the trade agreements.  This view naïvely assumes members can be 
made to comply even when compliance is contrary to their own interests.  Finally, less-
than-perfect compliance constitutes no threat to the trade regime.  Rather, it is an 
essential escape valve in a system driven by increasing judicialization and adjudicator 
activism.  Viewed in this more flexible perspective, noncompliance appears as a 
method of last resort, accommodating members' strong political and economic interests 
as they can no longer count on the diplomatic flexibility of the previous GATT system.  
Accordingly, instead of threatening the trade system's normativity, such rare deviations 
allow its continued operation while its rules, as interpreted through bilateral litigation, 
cannot properly accommodate certain losing parties' strong political economy 
constraints nor defer to the notable power asymmetries in the multilateral system.   
Part I of this article outlines the general features of the WTO dispute settlement 
system and discusses how prior empirical analyses of adjudication have dealt with the 
uniform pattern of Complainant success.  Because neither case, litigant or product-
specific differences in disputes can account for the disparity in 
                                                 
4
See William J. Davey, Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results Have Been 
Achieved Through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports?, in THE WTO IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN 
ASIA 98 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al ., 2007); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and 
Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 
AM. J. INT'L L. 335 (2000). 
5 See USDA: Brazil Seeks GSM 102 Changes To At Least Match Doha Draft Text, Inside 
U.S. Trade World Trade Online (Apr. 30, 2010), available at www.insidetrade.com (last 
accessed Jun. 17, 2010) (describing how Brazil is currently using its victory in the Cotton 
dispute and its right to retaliate against the US to either eliminate this WTO-incompatible 
subsidy program "or at least change it to reflect the latest Doha round agriculture draft 
modalities text.") and LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND TEXT 321 (John H. Jackson et.al, eds., 5th ed. 2008) (stating that "WTO 
members may be tempted to use the dispute settlement system to try to achieve what has 
eluded them in negotiations."). 
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Complainant/Respondent win rates, I discuss a number of competing theories (e.g., 
Respondent protectionism, settlement restraint effect, etc.) and explain why, so far, 
biased rule development seems to provide the most compelling explanation for this 
discrepancy.  Part II expands the empirical analysis into compliance disputes and 
investigates whether this type of "enforcement" adjudication protects the pro-free trade 
interests so overwhelmingly supported in substantive adjudication.  After detecting that 
is the case, I surmise that WTO adjudication is self-consistent, even if WTO 
adjudicators do not exhibit any outright bias in compliance cases, as, at that stage, mere 
unbiased application of rules will protect prior pro-free trade results.  Part III 
investigates the extent to which noncompliance might constitute a threat to this regime, 
as prior literature has suggested, and explains the current level of noncompliance is a 
necessary feature of the international trade system.  It also explains why proposals 
calling for increased WTO enforcement abilities are unlikely to improve compliance 
and posits that a minimum level of noncompliance affords flexibility to an increasingly 
judicialized and activist dispute settlement system.  The article concludes by arguing 
that compliance-related issues must be viewed in a broader perspective that transcends 
narrow legalistic views of the trade regime and accounts for the multifaceted interests 
of, and differences among, WTO members.   
I. The Structure and Operation of Substantive Adjudication 
A. Background on the WTO Dispute Resolution System 
To enable members to protect their bargained-for trade concessions (e.g., 
tariff reductions, elimination of non-tariff barriers, market access) against trade-
restrictive measures, the WTO agreements provide a mechanism of binding dispute 
settlement.6  WTO panels and the Appellate Body deliberate and make rulings on 
disputes submitted by aggrieved members under the supervision of the Dispute 
Settlement Body ("DSB").  Specifically, where either a panel or the Appellate Body 
finds that a challenged member's measure "impairs or nullifies" another member's 
"benefits accruing" under one of the "covered agreements," the adjudicator prepares a 
final report, and then submits it to the DSB for formal adoption.7  Once the DSB 
meets, it must adopt the report unless, by consensus, it decides against adoption.8   
This adoption-by-default rule represents a major departure from the former 
GATT system, which required a positive consensus by all parties, including 
                                                 
6 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, arts. 1(1), 
7(2), 22(3), Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) 
[hereinafter DSU].  By the express language of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT") 1994 Article 1(a), the provisions of GATT remain effective "as rectified, amended 
or modified by the terms of the" more recent WTO agreements.  General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 1(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
7 See id. at art. XXIII; DSU at arts. 16(4) and 17(14). 
8 Id.  
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Respondents, before adoption of a report.  Significantly, because violators can no 
longer rely on this particular legal safeguard to block enforcement, the new WTO 
regime effectively abolished the formal "veto" in trade disputes.  That, to date, no 
report has been blocked9 is as much a direct result of the operation of the new reverse 
consensus rule as it is proof of how the system has become increasingly judicialized, 
i.e., no longer dependent on final diplomatic negotiations among the affected parties.  
Suffice it to say that now the losing Respondent must bring its violating measure(s) 
into conformity with the prior ruling or face the prospect of lawful retaliation by its 
opponent (e.g., increase tariffs, suspension of intellectual property royalty payments, 
etc.) by an amount equivalent to the cost of the violation.10  Whether the end of report 
blocking and the ensuing judicialization did effectively remove the veto from the 
trade system is a question I examine later.   
B. The Legal Structure of WTO Substantive Disputes 
By "substantive disputes," I mean disagreements as to the effective operation 
of the various substantive norms in the WTO Agreements, as distinguished from 
disagreements as to whether a defeated Respondent has satisfactorily adopted 
measures to comply with a prior report or judgment.  This distinction is important not 
because there is intrinsic value in divining any ontological substance/procedure 
demarcation criterion in WTO law.  Rather, it is useful because whether adjudication 
patterns observed in substantive litigation are also observed in compliance litigation 
can help one ascertain whether the WTO adjudicatory system ensures that successful 
litigants in one stage also carry their victories to the other stage, when compliance is 
the issue.  Therefore, only by looking at both types of litigation can one make 
empirical statements about whether WTO adjudication is outcome-consistent, 
regardless of party status (i.e., aggrieved party or alleged violator), the posture in 
which one might appear in a case (i.e., Complainant or Respondent) or the original 
subject matter of the dispute (i.e., the agreement under which it arose).   
Among the substantive norms used to gauge whether a measure amounts to a 
"nullification" of another member's rights—thus giving rise to a substantive dispute—
the most important are the most-favored-nation ("MFN") principle, the national 
treatment or non-discrimination principle, and the general prohibition against 
quantitative (i.e., nontariff) measures.  These norms generally prohibit discrimination 
among goods and services imported from or provided by any member and proscribe 
discrepancies in the treatment of foreign and domestic goods and services.  Such 
broad requirements are subject to qualified exceptions.  Specifically, members have 
retained the GATT-based right to apply offsetting tariffs to "dumped"11 or 
                                                 
9 See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, Appellate Body 
Reports, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_reports_e.htm (last visited July 6, 
2010).   
10 DSU at art. 22(2). 
11 Generally, "dumping" refers to the practice of selling products in the importing market 
at prices lower than their "normal value" (e.g., home market price, where available).  See 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
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impermissibly subsidized products that cause material injury to domestic producers.12  
A set of strong public policy exceptions was also preserved from the GATT years.  
Among these exceptions are measures deemed necessary to protect public morals,13 
measures relating to conservation of natural resources,14 and emergency trade 
restrictions that safeguard a member's balance of payments.15  In sum, this framework 
of general rules and exceptions form the bulk of substantive norms that constitute the 
most frequent grounds for bringing and defending against WTO substantive cases, the 
object of the empirical analyses to which I now turn.   
C. Empirical Analyses of Substantive Case Decisions
16
 
1. On Avoiding the Elephant in the Room 
Scholarship on WTO dispute settlement is as extensive as it is varied in its 
assessment of the system's overall performance and its methods of inquiry.  I focus 
primarily on empirical studies because they reveal a curious phenomenon: although 
analyses of case outcomes repeatedly show a high rate of Complainant success 
(generally ranging from 80 percent to the high 90s), there is very little discussion, 
much less a developed consensus, on what this might mean.  For example, Hudec 
analyzed GATT dispute outcomes from 1948 to 1989.17  He found that the GATT 
dispute settlement procedure, the precursor to the current WTO system, resolved a 
high percentage of disputes in favor of Complainants (88 percent overall).18  Nowhere 
does he attempt to provide an explanation for the high Complainant win rate, except 
when he discusses antidumping ("AD") and countervailing duty ("CVD") cases.   
Specifically, Hudec posits that "the typical arbitrariness of AD/CVD criteria" 
and "the ascension of AD/CVD measures to a place of importance in national trade 
policy might . . . be a sign of other, deeper tendencies toward noncompliant 
                                                                                                                                           
Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994) [hereinafter AD Agreement]. 
12 See GATT 1994 at art. VI; AD Agreement at art. 3; Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 5, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 14, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]  
13 GATT 1994 at art. XX(a).  
14 Id. at art. XX(g). 
15 Id. at arts. V, XII. 
16 Unfortunately, all prior empirical studies of WTO litigation (except Colares') are based 
on datasets that do not distinguish between substantive and compliance disputes.  Because 
overall results in all studies are quite similar, this distinction, though important for purposes 
of Part II, will not be considered here.   
17 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 273 (1993). 
18 See id. at 353. 
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behavior."19  Unfortunately, other than an expression of his ideological opposition to 
these types of laws, Hudec's explanation limits itself to a particular set of cases and 
offers merely a conclusory assertion that Respondents lost because they are 
protectionists.  That GATT & WTO Respondent and Complainant win rates have 
diverged over time, when the positive theory of litigation suggests they should 
converge at some point,20 apparently has not prompted much reflection beyond the 
traditional "Respondent qua protectionist" fall back narrative.  Indeed, this puzzle 
remained unaddressed until quite recently.   
Other empirical studies have been more ambitious in that they attempt to test 
hypotheses about the operation of the WTO dispute settlement system, going beyond 
mere description of the main variables of litigation.  Although not squarely 
addressing the question of concern here, these studies offer important theoretical 
explanations about phenomena related to the evolution of the WTO adjudicatory 
system.  For instance, Guzman and Simmons look at settlement activity in WTO 
litigation and find that transaction costs, such as domestic political economy 
constraints, members' inability to make deals involving transfers in unrelated areas 
and members' general reluctance to procure settlement via cash payments, reduce the 
scope of settlement activity in WTO adjudication.21  They also raise an important 
theoretical issue: the operation of the MFN principle might limit members' 
willingness to enter into settlements because they hesitate to offer concessions that 
"may have to be granted to every WTO member state."22  This insight is significant 
because if, due to some feature of the WTO system's design, members face significant 
settlement constraints, high Complainant win rates might be attributed to 
Respondents' inability to settle.  Similarly, despite its tremendous significance, this 
settlement-limitation effect has not received the attention it deserves (I return to this 
point later). 
With a similar focus on settlement activity, Busch and Reinhardt find that 
Complainants are more likely to obtain better concessions in the consultations (i.e., 
pre-litigation) stage than later.  They posit that the onset of full blown litigation 
increases domestic pressures in favor of the challenged trade restrictive measure and, 
thus, reduces the incentives for settlement.23  Whether the MFN principle does in fact 
constrain settlement activity or whether the start of actual litigation reduces the size 
                                                 
19 See id. at 355. 
20 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (1984).  Specifically, the theory suggests that, absent information and 
stake asymmetries, parties tend to adjust their taste for litigation based on signals emanating 
from the litigation environment, with stronger cases settling rather than going to full 
adjudication.   
21 See Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel?  An Empirical 
Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 210-11 (2002). 
22 See id. at 210. 
23 See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early 
Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 162-63 (2000). 
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of settlements, none of these articles say much about how the settlement rate is likely 
to affect the Complainant and Respondent litigation calculus and likelihood of 
success.24   
2. The Dominant Narrative's Blind Spot 
As discussed, most empirical analyses of WTO litigation either do not 
measure or fail to fully address the continuing success disparity between 
Complainants and Respondents.25  Despite occasionally noting the empirical 
regularity in Complainants very high win rate, the empirical literature's remarkable 
fascination with the increasing judicialization of the WTO system and its casual 
adoption of received "Respondent-qua-protectionist" narratives contributes to an 
astonishing lack of reflection on the reasons for such an important asymmetry in the 
system.  As an example, take the rarely questioned received view that a dispute 
resolution system predicated on free trade exists to correct the potential politically-
motivated "tilt" of national agencies in favor of trade restrictive measures that put 
national trade policy in direct collision with international commitments.26  Following 
this view, many commentators surmise, as Hudec and others do, that the high rate of 
national agency loss at the WTO (reflected in Respondents' very low win rate) is a 
mere direct result of the WTO adjudicatory system doing what it is supposed to do: 
reversing the effects of national agency protectionist bias.27   
                                                 
24
But see Colares, supra note 2 at 413-16.   
25 See, e.g., HUDEC, supra note 17 at 355 (discussing the growth in the use of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism by all parties); William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement 
System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 18 (2005)(focusing solely on the success 
of the "major users" of the WTO dispute settlement system when they appear as 
Complainants); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does the U.S. Support International Tribunals?  The Case 
of the Multilateral Trade System, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 322 (Cesare Romano ed., 2009) (arguing that, as a 
Complainant, the US "has been successful in virtually all of the cases it has pursued 
seriously," and explaining that the US generally complies when it loses because the DSB and 
the WTO rule-based system maximize US economic interests); and Marc L. Busch et al., 
Does Legal Capacity Matter?  Explaining Dispute Initiation and Antidumping Actions in the 
WTO 1 (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. Programme on Dispute Settlement, Issue 
Paper No. 2, 2008) (theorizing that LDCs are less likely to bring claims at the WTO due to a 
weaker legal capacity).  
26 See, e.g., GARY HORLICK, WTO & NAFTA RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON ANTIDUMPING, SUBSIDIES & OTHER MEASURES 15 (2003); Judith 
Goldstein, International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American 
"Unfair" Trade Laws, 50 INT’L ORG. 541 (1996); John M. Mercury, Chapter 19 of the 
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1989-95: A Check on Administered 
Protection?, 15 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 525 (1995); Arun Venkataraman, Note, Binational 
Panels and Multilateral Negotiations: A Two-Track Approach to Limiting Contingent 
Protection, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 533, 578-79 (1999). 
27 See, JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
148 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (proposing that as bound tariffs decline, states have an 
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However, reliance on such a broad agency capture argument is problematic.  
For while agency capture might result from domestic producers' political mobilization 
to obtain trade protection, the same argument can be used to demonstrate that it is at 
least equally plausible that foreign producers, in alliance with import-consuming 
industries, are also able to engage in similar rent-seeking efforts, since the costs that 
duties imposed on them may exceed the benefits that domestic producers might 
derive from them.  In fact, many US administrative proceedings, especially in the 
AD/CVD area, involve at least as concentrated downstream US consuming industries 
as they involve US producers seeking trade barriers (e.g., softwood lumber, steel, 
wheat, pork, etc.).  As members of highly integrated industries in vertical production 
chains, foreign producers and domestic importing interests may actually present 
better candidates for collective action.  Although not all agencies behave alike, at a 
minimum, one must view agency action as reflecting more than just domestic 
producers' rent-seeking efforts.   
While the broader empirical question of whether national agencies have been 
faithful to the intent of the WTO agreements when applying national law lies outside 
the scope of this article, one must acknowledge that high Complainant success rates 
and their corollary, high rates of agency loss, are hardly direct evidence of bias 
correction, much less a confirmation that national trade restricting measures are 
protectionist.  The empirical literature's tendency to look favorably at WTO litigation 
is at least partly attributable to its reliance on half-thought, outdated narratives that 
view this adjudicatory system as merely engaged in bias correction; a view that has 
not received the reflection it deserves.  Indeed, regardless of one's subjective views on 
the national agency bias question, whether WTO adjudication's high rate of 
Complainant success and agency loss is a response to captured agency 
decisionmaking should be openly investigated and discussed, not assumed away as 
commentators rush to look at other presumably more testable hypotheses.   
3. Complainant and Respondent Success Rate Asymmetry: 
The Search for an Answer 
Two studies have sought to explain Complainants' overall high success rate in 
WTO adjudication and, for this reason, stand apart.  Maton & Maton analyze all 
WTO disputes through 2004 and find that Complainants win 81.9 percent of panel 
rulings.28 They also determine that neither Complainants' economic power, previous 
use of the DSB, nor the presence of third-party litigants can account for 
Complainants' win rate.29  In light of these results, Maton & Maton refute prior 
anecdotal studies30 that suggested WTO adjudicators are influenced by extra-legal 
pressures from more powerful members.31  In concluding that their findings 
                                                                                                                                           
incentive to cheat "by inventing . . . nontariff barriers that [are] fiendishly obscure," thus 
perpetuating the received view that national agencies are but agents of protectionism). 
28 Maton & Maton, supra note 2 at 328.   
29 Id. at 325-28.   
30 Id. at 320-21.   
31 Id. at 333.   
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demonstrate WTO adjudicators "are immune from such pressures," 32 the authors, as 
others before them, pass on the opportunity to further investigate or theorize on their 
other major finding: the Complainant/Respondent success asymmetry.   
a. Why Immunity from Member Influence Matters 
Admittedly, Maton & Maton's finding that WTO adjudicators are not sensitive 
to Complainants' economic power is relevant as far as the win rate asymmetry is 
concerned: it eliminates one major source of bias from consideration.  Yet, the 
absence of favoritism toward great economic powers, such as the US, EU and Japan, 
cannot prove that WTO adjudication is "immune" from every source of bias.  Because 
WTO adjudication is essentially a "bilateral means" of solving trade disputes in a 
multilateral system,33 observing a few major countries' success rates as Complainants 
could hardly provide the ultimate test for detecting all sources of bias.  Arguably, any 
eventual tilt in the system is much more likely to express itself in the triumph of one 
version of multilateralism over another (e.g., adopting an activist liberal view of trade 
vs. adopting a jurisprudence that balances free trade against legitimate trade 
restrictions) rather than in the adoption of one or a few members' unilateral 
preferences.  Indeed, powerful member influence, though undeniable, is significantly 
diluted in an organization with 153 members (as of July 2008).34   
Thus, besides coding for winners and losers, to find any bias in the WTO 
adjudicatory system, one would have to look beyond the identity of the litigant (i.e., 
Country A or Country B) to the posture in which a litigant is appearing (i.e., 
Complainant or Respondent), and the arguments each is making under WTO law.  
For example, if it turns out that the same countries exhibiting high rates of success as 
Complainants also have low rates of success as Respondents, then one might be 
justified not only to discard bias for or against such countries—as Maton & Maton 
do—but also wonder if there is a bias against all Respondents.  Yet, before one could 
make an argument for bias, one should investigate whether other variables, such as 
case subject matter, differences in standards of review or type of product involved, 
might explain such discrepancy.  For it is possible that the same multilateral concerns 
that gave rise to differences among agreements might account for such disparities.  
Should that be the case, rather than being biased against Respondents, adjudicators 
might merely be adjusting their decisions to account for such agreement-based 
variations.  Finally, if one finds that none of these variables can account for the 
consistently high Complainant success rate, then one might verify whether 
adjudicators' adoption of certain interpretive positions varies with respect to the 
posture of the litigant and the argument it makes.  Only in the latter case can an 
argument for bias be made.  Although Maton & Maton do not venture into 
formulating or rejecting such alternative explanations, they suggest that further 
                                                 
32 Id. at 333.   
33 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27 at 135. 
34 See Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
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research, incorporating a wider range of variables, would be necessary to more fully 
understand WTO adjudication.35   
b. The Case for Biased Rule Development 
Colares accepted Maton & Maton's suggestion, used a more comprehensive 
database that both included more recent cases (through September 2007) and coded 
for the usual variables (e.g., Income Level, Third-Party Involvement, etc.) as well as a 
number of additional variables (e.g., Case Type, Party Identity, Product Type, etc.).36  
One illustration: when considering the agreements under which disputes arose (coded 
under the "Case Type" variable), Colares hypothesized that the specific, more agency-
deferential standard of review in the AD Agreement should lead to lower 
Complainant success rates in AD cases than the general, less deferential "objective 
assessment" standard of review applicable to disputes arising under other 
agreements.37  He found that despite the agency-friendly, Chevron-like level of 
deference under the AD agreement,38 Respondent win rates were actually lower (9 
percent) in AD cases than in any other type of dispute.39   
After finding that Complainants' success rates remained high (i.e., 80 percent 
and above) regardless of differences in categories of cases and litigants considered, 
Colares discussed why none of the alternative empirical explanations, such as case 
selection, stake and information asymmetries and the potential MFN settlement-
constraint effect, could account for Complainants' stellar litigation performance.40  In 
fact, because neither case-specific distinctions, litigant-based variations nor 
alternative explanations could explain Complainant success and the same countries 
exhibiting high rates of success as Complainants also had low rates of success as 
Respondents, Colares pondered the possibility of a bias against all Respondents.41  
This bias, defined as "the result of a process of authoritative normative evolution . . . 
that expresse[s] itself with a tilt favoring Complainants,"42 if detected in WTO 
decision patterns, could explain Complainants' pervasive success in every type of 
WTO substantive dispute.   
To verify the existence such pro-Complainant decisional patterns, Colares 
looked closely at two sets of cases: the first ten AD disputes, where adjudicators 
                                                 
35 Maton & Maton, supra note 2 at 333-34.   
36 Colares, supra note 2 at 402-12. 
37 DSU at art. 11.  
38 See AD Agreement at art. 17(6) (stating that a national measure will be in conformity 
with the Agreement if it rests upon a permissible interpretation of law and that agencies' fact 
findings will not be disturbed, even when "the panel might have reached a different 
conclusion," so long as they are "unbiased and objective").   
39 Colares, supra note 2 at 403. 
40 Id. at 412-22. 
41 Id. at 422. 
42 Id. 
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would presumably explain their views on the AD Agreement's more agency 
deferential standard of review; and disputes involving the use of declarations arising 
under different agreements (e.g., AD, GATT, SCM and the Agreement on 
Government Procurement43).44  He explains the choice of these cases on two separate 
grounds.  First, the AD cases not only have important precedential value as early 
cases, but also contain the WTO adjudicators' earliest and most considered 
justification for striking down agencies' decisions under the most pro-agency 
standard.45  Indeed, in light of the high rate of agency reversal in these disputes, this 
would be the ideal setting in which to verify the occurrence of bias.  Second, the cases 
involving declarations span different areas under WTO law, thus providing a broader 
context in which to detect bias.  Moreover, in these cases, Respondents and 
Complainants argued for and against giving binding effect to declarations, and WTO 
adjudicators made seemingly irreconcilable rulings, sometimes construing 
declarations as binding, other times construing them as merely aspirational.46  Should 
decisions to give declarations one effect or the other vary with respect to the posture 
in which a litigant appears, one would not only reconcile these rulings, but argue bias 
is at least a plausible explanation, since declarations embody the intent of negotiators 
during the same round of negotiations, employ similar language and, thus, 
presumably deserve the same treatment.   
In both sets of cases, Colares identifies two central tendencies: hollowing out 
Respondents' rights under the agreements (e.g., by conflating the AD and DSU 
standards of review into an amorphous de novo standard, by giving no effect to 
declarations that favor Respondents, etc.) and expanding the scope of Respondents' 
obligations beyond the negotiated agreements (e.g., by creating extraneous, ad hoc 
tests to gauge Respondents' conduct during investigations, by finding an obligation to 
engage in multilateral negotiations before implementing regulations where none 
previously existed, etc.).47  He argues that, combined, these decisions have promoted 
trade liberalization at the expense of the reservations members made during 
negotiations, effectively reducing Respondents' regulatory discretion.48  While, 
legally, the result is a jurisprudence that "clarifies the existing provisions of the 
agreements consistently in one direction"49 (i.e., in favor of Complainants), 
politically, the practical consequence is the continuous "transfer of decisional power" 
away from members to a select few WTO adjudicators.50  This creation of 
                                                 
43 Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GPA]. 
44 Colares, supra note 2 at 423-24, 429-30.      
45  Id. at429-30.      
46 Id. at 430-35.      
47 Id. at 436.      
48 Id.      
49 Id. (citation omitted).  
50 Id. at 437.      
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nonnegotiated obligations under the guise of interpreting the negotiated agreements, 
Colares argues, goes beyond the scope of the original authorization to act as neutral 
third parties in disputes involving endogenously incomplete contracts.51  In sum, 
Colares faults WTO adjudicators not for completing the "optimally incomplete" WTO 
agreements, but for completing them consistently against Respondents.52   
That WTO adjudicators' interpretive positions across a broad range of disputes 
vary with respect to the posture and argument of the litigant explains why focusing on 
the identity of particular winners and losers would not reveal the tangible bias in the 
system.  Yet, case-transcending trends do exist, can account for the systematic pro-
Complainant win rate and, more importantly, can explain the puzzling lack of 
convergence in Complainant and Respondent success rates, even after a decade and a 
half of operation.53   
c. Challenges to Biased Rule Development 
If case selection, information asymmetry and stake asymmetry cannot account 
for the sustained pattern of Complainant success, as Colares claims,54 then bias is a 
serious contender among theories that would explain why WTO adjudication 
outcomes deviate from the positive theory of litigation's prediction that Complainants 
and Respondents must experience a roughly equivalent share of litigation success.  
One still has to consider the potential explanatory power of a few additional 
theoretical rivals: the familiar "Respondent qua protectionist" argument, the 
"settlement-restraint" effect and the "low volume of filings" paradox.   
i. The Respondent qua Protectionist Argument 
As the most commonly advanced explanation for the sustained pattern of 
Complainant success in dispute resolution,55 the protectionist argument is overbroad 
in its assumption that Respondents are always motivated by protectionist pressures, 
never acting to vindicate legitimate, WTO-compliant regulatory policy.  Remarkably, 
protectionism alone cannot fully explain why WTO adjudicators would develop an 
AD jurisprudence that disregards the more deferential AD standard of review if they 
are merely reacting against cheating.56  If that were true, members would simply not 
                                                 
51 Id.   
52 Id. at 397 (citation omitted).   
53 The data in this article is current through September 2009 and confirms Colares' prior 
results.  Compare id. at 419-422 with infra Part II.B.3. 
54 Colares, supra note 2 at 412-13, 416-17 (citation omitted). 
55 See generally HORLICK, supra note 26 at 15; Goldstein, supra note 26; Mercury, supra 
note 26; HUDEC, supra note 17; J. Michael Finger & Tracey Murray, Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Enforcement in the United States in ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS 
AND WHO GETS HURT?, 241 (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993). 
56 See, e.g., Colares, supra note 2 at 423-29 (demonstrating how the Egypt-Steel Rebar 
panel, in applying the DSU "objective assessment" standard of review (Art. 11) 
"simultaneously" with the AD standard (Art. 17.6(i)), engaged in a more intrusive review of 
the agency's fact-finding than the AD standard authorizes).   
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meet the standard, no matter how leniently or restrictively construed.  Similarly, 
agency protectionism cannot reconcile rulings that give different effect to 
declarations, shifting their legal status according to the particular interests advanced 
by Complainants while restraining otherwise legitimate agency action.57  In sum, the 
result is a pattern of decisions that systematically favors Complainants not because 
adjudicators are correcting national agency protectionism, but because adjudicators 
have adopted a result-driven, teleological version of free trade that requires such 
interpretive contortions.   
ii. The Settlement-Restraint Effect 
A more serious competitor to the bias theory would be the existence of 
structural constraints on Respondents' ability to settle disputes.  As discussed earlier, 
Guzman & Simmons suggest that the MFN principle might constrain settlement 
activity because offering concessions in one dispute, a prerequisite for any settlement, 
triggers the obligation to extend similar concessions to all other WTO members.58  
Arguably, in light of the MFN requirement, Respondents would naturally hesitate to 
offer concessions, opting instead for full adjudication of even weak cases, which, in 
turn, would explain their higher than expected, non-converging rate of loss.  If this 
argument is well founded, Colares' bias theory would be harder to support, for even in 
unbiased adjudication, Respondents' win rates could not converge with Complainants' 
if Respondents are consistently adjudicating weak cases.  However, this settlement-
restraint effect is theoretically flawed and can be refuted empirically.  While 
theoretically bound by the MFN requirement, WTO members are exempt from 
extending concessions to all other members when they are already in or enter into 
Preferential Trade Agreements ("PTAs"), a fundamental exception to the MFN 
principle.59  Although one would not argue that members enter into PTAs solely for 
this particular reason, their existence frees members from the MFN's unconditional 
multilateral reciprocation requirement, thus attenuating any the settlement-
constraining effect the operation of this principle might cause.   
The MFN thesis also fails empirically.  Colares tested its plausibility by 
separately regressing Respondents' trade-to-GDP ratios and import-to-GDP ratios 
against their settlement rates.  If the MFN principle has a settlement-constraining 
effect, Colares hypothesized, this effect will increase as Respondents' trade 
dependence increases.  Specifically, the higher a Respondent's trade-to-GDP or 
import-to-GDP ratio is, the less likely it is to settle, because any concession granted 
has a comparatively larger impact on its economy.60  Because neither of these 
regression models, nor their individual regressors, were statistically significant (.05 
probability level), Colares refuted the hypothesis that Respondents' concerns over the 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., id. at 430-35 (comparing the interpretation of a pro-Respondent declaration as 
merely aspirational in US–Leaded Bar with the interpretation of a pro-Complainant 
declaration as effectively binding in US–Shrimp/Turtle).  
58 See Guzman & Simmons, supra note 21 at 210 and GATT 1994 at art. I.   
59 Id. at art. XXIV. 
60 Colares, supra note 2 at 414-15.   
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potential economic impact of concessions, the MFN effect, depresses the settlement 
rate.  The lack of empirical support for an MFN-based settlement-constraining effect, 
besides providing indirect support to the idea that there are flexible ways around the 
MFN principle, also conforms to earlier findings of substantial settlement activity in 
GATT/WTO litigation.61  Because the MFN thesis has clear theoretical limitations 
and is contradicted by empirical evidence, the high rate of Respondent losses is not 
the product of having to litigate weak cases that cannot be settled.  This does not 
mean that Respondents litigate only strong cases, it merely demonstrates that MFN 
pressures cannot account for the lack of win rate convergence.   
iii. The Low Volume of Filings Paradox 
Finally, one may counter that if the high rate of Complainant success is the 
result of bias, then it would be difficult to explain the paradoxically small number of 
disputes adjudicated so far (117 adopted reports as of September 2009).  That rational 
Complainants would file cases seriatim to maximize utility from biased adjudication 
is hardly the necessary result, however.  In a multilateral system, high success in 
bilateral litigation will not necessarily lead to more filings if Complainants realize 
that every trade liberalizing decision creates precedent that further restricts the 
universe of regulatory choices they may want to adopt in the future.  Viewed in this 
way, appearing before a court that is more than willing to restrain members' ability to 
regulate trade can produce an interesting form of "winner's curse," and would thus 
explain why a potential biased adjudicator might not be so attractive, even to the 
favored litigant.  In fact, in this system, the most litigious members have also been the 
most frequent Respondents and the latter experience might explain their caution to 
use a system that will further reduce their discretion as sovereign states.  Plausibly, 
their inability to achieve a similar level of success as Complainants when appearing 
in the opposite posture has apparently served them well.   
d. Implications of Biased Rule Development 
The bias theory, if correct, would fill a significant gap in the empirical 
literature on WTO adjudication, a gap that, to date, has not been closed by any 
serious, overarching explanation for the existence of a strikingly uniform pattern of 
Complainant success, regardless of case, litigant or product-specific differences in 
disputes.  A pro-Complainant bias would imply that, far from optimally balancing the 
value of trade liberalization against the interest in regulatory diversity—a balance 
members struck by negotiating terms intended to safeguard "the values and norms 
                                                 
61 See Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 23 at 158-59 (stating that "fully three-fifths of all 
disputes end prior to a panel ruling, and most of these without a request for a panel even 
being made.").  It should be noted that their methodology for counting cases differs from 
Colares'.  Unlike Busch & Reinhardt, who count cases from the moment a request for 
consultations is made (i.e., including the pre-litigation stage), Colares counts only cases in 
which a panel is requested.  This explains why Colares finds a much lower rate of settlement 
(about 30 percent).  See Colares, supra note 2 at 413.  As discussed infra Part II.B.3, this 
difference is quite important in the discussion regarding case selection.   
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that shape"62 their different societies (e.g., GATT, art. XX)—WTO adjudicators have 
adopted an ambitious judicial philosophy that teleologically advances a liberal view 
of trade and deviates from the considered original will of the WTO members.   
This finding has many other serious implications, some of which Colares 
discussed (e.g., displacement of members' legitimate policy choices, impact on 
current trade negotiations, etc.),63 but, more importantly, it may explain why some 
powerful members, in the absence of a formal veto, have occasionally delayed 
compliance or refused to comply with certain DSB judgments.  After all, if the 
involvement of third parties does not lead to consistently neutral verdicts, then 
dispute resolution is no longer superior to bilateral normal diplomatic channels or, 
depending on the stakes involved, occasional noncompliance,64 the topic to which I 
now turn.   
II. The Legal Structure and Role of Compliance Adjudication 
A. General Remarks 
As previously explained (see Part I.A.), following DSB adoption of a panel or 
Appellate Body report, the offending country must eliminate the violating measure 
and bring its practices into compliance with the ruling.65  Members must comply 
within a "reasonable time,"66 as failure to do so triggers the possibility of suspension 
of concessions (i.e., retaliation) on the part of the prevailing member.67  When it is 
impractical for a Member to comply immediately, members may resort to binding 
arbitration to determine the "reasonable period of time" for compliance ("Article 
21(3)(c) Arbitration").68  Where there is disagreement regarding whether a member 
has complied with the panel or AB's recommendations, the DSB designates, when 
possible, the original panel (i.e., the panel that decided the substantive case) to settle 
such disputes ("Article 21(5) Review").69  Should the original Complainant also 
prevail in the latter type of dispute, it may request compensation (e.g., further tariff 
concessions, increased market access, etc.) in lieu of suspending concessions against 
the offending member.70  Finally, when disputes over the level or method of 
retaliation arise, members shall submit such disputes to arbitration ("Article 22(6) 
Arbitration"), which shall also "be carried out by the original panel," if these 
                                                 
62 Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations, in GLOBALIZATION: WHAT'S NEW? 196, 199 
(Michael M. Weinstein ed. 2005). 
63 Colares, supra note 2 at 435-38.   
64 See Andrew Guzman, Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 307-08 (2002).   
65 DSU at art. 23(2)(a). 
66 Id. at art. 22(1). 
67
See id. at art. 22. 
68 Id. at art 21(3)(c).   
69 See id. at art 21(5). 
70 See id. at art. 22(2).   
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adjudicators are available.71  In these cases, the arbitrator's jurisdiction is limited to 
the amount of nullification or impairment and whether the form of retaliation is 
allowed under the agreements; the arbitrator may not revisit previously litigated 
issues.72  Because the mere possibility of applying such countermeasures provides a 
substantial incentive for compliance, suspension of WTO obligations against the 
offending member is generally the exception—members usually comply or offer 
some form of compensation.   
B. An Empirical Analysis of Compliance Decisions 
1. A Caveat on the Implications of Posture Reversals 
Clearly, compliance disputes involve issues ancillary to, yet not directly 
involving, adjudication of WTO substantive rules.  Remarkably, previous empirical 
scholarship on WTO adjudication tends not to segregate and compare compliance and 
substantive adjudication when analyzing the overall operation of the system.  Yet, the 
issues decided under each type of litigation are not the same.  Specifically, whereas 
substantive adjudication considers whether members' conduct conforms to their 
primary WTO obligations, compliance adjudication considers members' conduct with 
respect to a duty of a derived or secondary nature: the duty to comply with WTO 
rulings.   
This distinction would not matter much if one observed no major 
discrepancies in outcomes between these forms of litigation.  Even if that proved to 
be the case, having a similar outcome profile does not obviate the need to investigate 
how each form of litigation might affect Complainants' and Respondents' interests 
differently.  For example, Complainants in substantive disputes may not be 
Complainants in certain compliance disputes.  In Article 22(6) "Level of Suspension" 
Arbitration, a successful Complainant might appear as a Respondent if the erstwhile 
Respondent challenges the amount of retaliation the erstwhile Complainant believes it 
can rightfully impose pursuant to its prior victory.  In this particular context, the 
current Complainant's grievance is the erstwhile Complainant's proposed level of 
retaliation, which will only be an impermissible trade restriction if it exceeds the level 
of actual nullification or impairment (i.e., overdeterrence).  Therefore, the potential 
for significant posture reversals blurs the categories of litigants and disturbs the 
conventional perception of the interests litigants represent.  As the example 
illustrates, traditional perceptions of erstwhile Complainants as favoring trade 
liberalization and erstwhile Respondents as wishing to restrict trade are no longer 
accurate and must be abandoned.   
Given this possibility, posture reversals might call into question any 
generalizations about the relative success of Complainants in WTO adjudication that 
do not account for the different interests that Complainants and Respondents may 
represent in different litigation contexts.  Thus, if WTO adjudication is indeed biased 
towards a particular version of free trade that produces a systematic pattern of 
Complainant wins in substantive cases, that bias is not likely to manifest itself in 
                                                 
71 Id. at art. 22(6).   
72 See id. at art. 22(7).   
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favor of Complainants when they no longer defend the pro-free trade argument at the 
compliance stage.  This caveat leads to two insights: the first somewhat trivial, the 
second a bit more surprising.  First, because a bias in favor of a particular version of 
free trade expresses itself in the vindication of that interest, not in the success of the 
litigant who may have originally spoken for it, compliance outcomes need not be as 
systematically pro-Complainant as substantive outcomes.  A "litigant reversal" effect, 
the result of possible shifts in Complainant and Respondent interests at the 
compliance stage will disturb the systematic pattern of high Complainant wins in 
substantive adjudication.  Second, since mere unbiased application of compliance 
rules is enough to protect the prior extremely pro-free trade results achieved in 
substantive litigation, WTO adjudicators need not exhibit any bias in compliance 
litigation: ensuring the enforcement of prior judgments is all that it takes.  If these two 
trends are observed, one should be able to conclude that WTO adjudication is 
unsurprisingly self-consistent, even if biased.   
2. Data and Methods 
a. Defining a Compliance Case 
For purposes of this study, a "compliance case" is a dispute in which a WTO 
member challenges another member's conduct in light of its duty to comply with, or 
its rights under, a prior WTO ruling.  These disputes occur some time after the DSB 
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report and are primarily concerned with 
enforcement.  Compliance adjudication involves the three major disputes defined in 
Part II.A., i.e., Article 21(3)(c) "Reasonable Time" Arbitration; Article 21(5) 
"Conformity" Review; and Article 22(6) "Level of Suspension" Arbitration.  As 
usual, data on such adjudication was collected from the WTO case database.73   
b. Determining Compliance Case Outcomes 
A compliance case is deemed "final" when the DSB either adopts panel or 
Appellate Body reports following Article 21(5) Reviews or approves the results from 
Article 21(3)(c) and Article 22(6) Arbitrations.  A "settled" compliance case is any 
case in which: (1) the complaining party withdraws the panel or arbitration request; 
(2) the DSB defers the establishment of a panel74 (usually to due to a request by both 
parties); (3) the DSB establishes a panel,75 but there has been no reported activity in 
the past three years; (4) the parties formally request that a panel stop its work76 or 
agree to postpone arbitration and neither panel nor arbitrator engage in deliberations 
for more than twelve months (lapse of authority); or (5) the parties officially notify 
the DSB that they have reached an agreed solution in a panel or arbitration 
                                                 
73
 See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm (last visited July 
7, 2010).   
74 See DSU at art. 6(1). 
75 See id. at art. 6. 
76 See id. at art. 12(12). 
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proceeding.77  Finally, a compliance case is considered "active" when a panel or 
arbitration request has been made and the panel, Appellate Body or arbitrator is 
currently working toward a formal disposition of the case or the parties have been 
engaged in negotiations for 12 months or less.  The following table contains a 
breakdown of all WTO cases from January1995 through September 2009: 
TABLE A: STATUS OF COMPLIANCE CASES 
Case Status Number of Cases 





These 61 final compliance rulings arose out of 42 original substantive disputes.  
Given that, to date, a total of 117 DSB substantive reports have been adopted, this 
indicates that outright compliance occurred about 64 percent of the time (75 out 117 
cases),78 with the remaining decisions (42 cases) eventually leading to some kind of 
compliance dispute.   
Before providing a more detailed analysis of compliance litigation outcomes, 
a few methodological points are in order.  First, litigants' success rates are calculated 
from the universe of final rulings (settled and active cases are not considered).  
Second, as usual, a Complainant is the party that initially files a request for a 
compliance proceeding.  Because Article 22.6 arbitrations are mostly filed by 
erstwhile Respondents seeking lower levels of retaliation (i.e., less trade restriction) 
on its exports, the reader should abandon traditional characterizations of litigants and 
focus instead on the interests they are likely to represent.  Third, a Complainant wins 
a case any time it prevails in its major claim, regardless of Respondent's occasional 
success in one or more secondary claims.  Eliminating the possibility of "mixed" 
cases in this manner simplifies the description and analysis of the results without 
compromising accuracy.   
 
 
                                                 
77 See id. at art. 3(6). 
78 Busch and Reinhardt found that the compliance rate increased from 40 percent under 
GATT to 66 percent under the WTO.  See Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, Testing 
International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. 
HUDEC, 457 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick, eds., 2002).  Another study, 
focusing on the first ten years of WTO dispute settlement, reported an 83% compliance rate.  
See William Davey, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL INT'L 
L.J. 119 (2009).   
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3. Results 
A mode of dispute settlement essentially concerned with enforcement, 
compliance adjudication focuses on timing to comply, whether compliance has 
occurred and whether the proposed level of retaliation correctly reflects the level of 
trade impaired.  Table B.1 illustrates the distribution of compliance cases.  It shows 
that the vast majority of compliance adjudications (52 cases or 85.25 percent) never 
reach the retaliation stage, as members may only retaliate after obtaining 
authorization, which requires filing for arbitration under Article 22(6).  Considering 
that only nine disputes out of 117 cases (7.69 percent) came to this final stage, one 
can conclude, as others have,79 that the WTO dispute settlement system has an 
admirable record of compliance.  That offending members may at times abuse the 
system to gain a temporary trade advantage—first, violating a rule; second, litigating 
a potentially meritless case; third, resisting compliance by exploiting procedural 
tactics at the compliance stage only to finally comply (or not)—does not belittle this 
record.  From ad hoc diplomacy to stronger sanctions authorized by third-party 
adjudicators, alternative methods of dispute settlement, with varying structures of 
incentives, simply cannot ensure countries will act with good faith in all international 
economic relations.   
TABLE B.1: COMPLIANCE CASES 
Compliance Case Types Number of Compliance Cases 
Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration 26 
Article 21(5) Review 26 
Article 22(6) Arbitration 9 
Total 61 
 
Although one should be cautious when interpreting results based on a limited 
number of cases, a look at how litigants have performed across compliance case 
categories reveals that Complainant Success Rates vary between 56 percent and 92 
percent (see Table B.2).  Clearly, Complainants' success rates are no longer uniformly 
high, as in substantive adjudication.  This wide variation in litigants' success rates 
might be an early indication that, at least at this stage, adjudication is responsive to 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of litigants' cases.  Yet, the occurrence of 
litigant reversals in compliance adjudication calls for a closer scrutiny of 
Complainant win rates. 
 
 
                                                 
79 See, e.g., id. at 122; Steve Charnovitz, The Enforcement of WTO Judgments, 34 YALE 
J. INT'L L. 558, 562 (2009); Jide Nzelibe, The Case Against Reforming the WTO Enforcement 
Mechanism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 323 (2008).  Part III will discuss some of these 
authors' assessments and critical views regarding compliance in the WTO system. 
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TABLE B.2:  COMPLAINANT WIN RATES IN COMPLIANCE CASES 
Compliance Case Type Complainant Success Rate 
Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration  76.92% 
Article 21(5) Review 92.31% 
Article 22(6) Arbitration 55.56% 
 
To examine the potential impact of a litigant reversal effect, I looked at 
erstwhile Complainants' performance in compliance adjudication.  This required 
accounting for all instances in which the Complainant in the underlying WTO dispute 
became the Respondent in the compliance proceeding.  This happened in four of 26 
Article 21(3)(c) arbitrations80 and in eight of nine Article 22(6) arbitrations.81  Again, 
as Table B.3 illustrates, erstwhile Complainants' success rates vary widely and differ 
significantly from the results observed in substantive adjudication.  Yet, more striking 
is the sharp separation between what they can accomplish as litigants in Article 
21(3)(c) and 21(5) proceedings versus Article 22(6) arbitrations.  As expected, this 
breakdown of erstwhile Complainants' systematic pattern of wins tracks the shift in 
the nature of interests they represent in "level of suspension" arbitrations.  At this 
stage, due to the nature of WTO remedies (generally retaliation against the 
recalcitrant member's exports), erstwhile Complainants are pursuing trade 
restrictions.  They are now on the opposite side, facing an adjudicatory system that 
favors a liberal version of free trade (see Part I discussion on substantive 
adjudication) and is invested in ensuring timely and full compliance with prior rulings 
(as are erstwhile Complainants), but is clearly weary of approving new trade 
restrictions at the level erstwhile Complainants desire.   
 
 
                                                 
80 See Arbitration Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/15 (May 29, 1998); Arbitration Report, Chile–Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/15 (May 23, 2000); Arbitration Report, Canada–Patent 
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/13 (Aug. 18, 2000); Arbitration Report, 
Chile–Price Brand System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural 
Products, WT/DS207/13 (Mar. 17, 2003). 
81 See Arbitration Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/ARB (July 7, 2009); Arbitration Report, European 
Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB 
(Apr. 9, 1999); Arbitration Report, Brazil–Export Financing Programme forAircraft, 
WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000); Arbitration Report, United States–Tax Treatment for 
"Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002); Arbitration Report, United 
States–Antidumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/ARB (Feb. 24, 2004); Arbitration Report, 
United States–Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/ARB (Aug. 
31, 2004); Arbitration Report, Canada–Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional 
Aircraft, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003); Arbitration Report, United States–Subsidies on 
Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/ARB (Aug. 31, 2009).   
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TABLE B.3:  ERSTWHILE COMPLAINANT WIN RATES IN COMPLIANCE CASES 
Compliance Case Type Erstwhile Complainant Success Rate 
Article 21(3)(c) Arbitration  92.31% 
Article 21(5) Review 92.31% 
Article 22(6) Arbitration 33.33% 
 
One also observes litigant reversals in Article 21(3)(c) Arbitrations, yet no 
decline in erstwhile Complainant success rates.  This is easy to explain and further 
corroborates the earlier expectation that the interest represented, not initial posture, 
matters.  First, erstwhile Complainants actually won all four cases in which they 
appeared as Respondents.  Second, and more importantly, erstwhile Complainants' 
high success rates in "reasonable time" arbitrations are attributable to their pursuing 
timely compliance, not trade restrictions.  Finally, they do well because their 
opponents (i.e., erstwhile Respondents) are typically resisting compliance by arguing 
for a longer interpretation of the reasonable time to comply.  Thus, erstwhile 
Complainants are unlikely to sue prematurely, as doing so undermines cooperation 
and reduces the likelihood of voluntary compliance.  Having won in substantive 
litigation, a wait-and-see strategy on the part of erstwhile Complainants increases the 
chances of compliance or success should subsequent litigation prove necessary.  
Meanwhile, erstwhile Respondents know that they can only play for time and 
eventually comply or face sanctions.   
Viewed in this light, erstwhile Complainants' performance across these case 
categories confirms the sense that judicialization through DSB proceedings is a 
success, at least as far as compliance adjudication is concerned (of course, substantive 
litigation is a different story).  Indeed, this analysis reveals that compliance 
proceedings overwhelmingly preserve the results winners obtained in prior 
adjudication, protecting the interests such litigation vindicated only insofar as they 
further trade liberalization.  One should also recognize that adjudicators are helped by 
the fact that they face a much clearer set of questions here than in substantive 
litigation.  At this stage, an offending member can either comply within a reasonable 
period or not; the object of such compliance is no longer some abstract norm, but a 
prior ruling by usually the same set of panelists; and determination of lawful levels of 
retaliation in monetary terms, while technical at times, does not necessarily require 
complex hermeneutic analysis.  Arguably, previously sensitized adjudicators, 
reviewing generally less complex questions, with more available information, can 
more easily distinguish genuine compliance issues from mere dilatory tactics or 
cheating behavior.  In combination with the effect of shifts in erstwhile Complainant 
and Respondent interests, these additional features help explain why bias need not be 
present at this stage to ensure that WTO adjudication is self-consistent.   
One could challenge the validity of these findings by arguing that mere 
investigation of fully adjudicated compliance disputes cannot provide an 
understanding of the general nature of WTO compliance adjudication, as several 
disputes are settled after filing and others might be settled with no filing ever taking 
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place.  Arguments for the existence of a case selection effect in the compliance 
context fail for two reasons.  First, post-filing settlement activity has a limited impact 
in the compliance litigation context, as three-quarters of all cases (61 of 81 cases) in 
which a panel or arbitrator was requested have been fully adjudicated.82  This high 
full-adjudication-to-filings ratio is the exact opposite of patterns observed in US civil 
litigation, where only 1.8 percent83 of federal civil cases84 are fully adjudicated and 
up to 72 percent of the disputes are terminated due to settlements.85  Clearly, the low 
frequency of post-filing settlements in WTO compliance cases undercuts the selection 
argument, as the subset of fully adjudicated disputes is fairly representative of what 
takes place in overall litigation.  Second, that settlements might have occurred 
following substantive adjudication, thus eliminating potential compliance case 
filings—indeed, 75 out of 117 substantive rulings never led to compliance filings86—
does not produce a selection effect relevant in this context.  Because compliance 
adjudication is only concerned with cases involving resistance to compliance, the 
occurrence of settlements is irrelevant to this form of litigation since parties obviously 
agreed to comply.   
4. The Aftermath of Compliance Litigation 
The above analysis of compliance cases reveals an adjudicatory system 
operating with high consistency, with erstwhile Complainants achieving a high rate of 
success so long as they maintain pro-free trade positions.  Of course, this still leaves 
the question of whether winners are made whole through the system, meaning when 
all litigation is done.  As Table B.1 demonstrates, the DSB adjudicated disputes 
concerning the level of suspension of concessions due to noncompliance in nine 
cases.87  It authorized suspension of concessions in six cases.88  Of these, actual 
                                                 
82 See supra Table A. 
83 Percentage from 2002.  See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of 
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 
461 (2004). 
84 Note that even in the realm of litigation that often involves high monetary stakes and 
litigants with substantial resources, such as intellectual property cases, the rate of trials as a 
percentage of dispositions is very low (2.4% in the US).  See id. at 463; 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007 PATENT AND TRADEMARK DAMAGES STUDY 
(2007), available at 
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/3ca24a75615f03948025711e004b69a0/$file/2
007_Patent_Study.pdf (reporting that the median award amount for 2005 was $6,000,000). 
85 See Gillian Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial 
Adjudications and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 729–33 (2004) (using data from 2000, including consent 
judgments, but not cases disposed of through abandonment or default). 
86 See supra Table A and accompanying discussion.   
87 See also Appendix containing detailed information about these cases and the level of 
suspensions authorized.   
88
 The suspensions were granted at DSB Meetings based on the requests of the WTO 
members in the following disputes: DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/59 (Apr. 19, 1999) & 
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retaliation occurred in only four instances, as Canada and Brazil chose not to impose 
largely offsetting sanctions upon each other in the aftermath of their aircraft 
disputes.89  Only two of the WTO's most powerful members, the EC (two cases) and 
the US (two cases), failed to comply after compliance litigation had run its course and 
submitted to retaliation.90  After a period of retaliation, the US eventually complied.91  
                                                                                                                                           
WT/DSB/M/80 (May 18, 2000), request by US & Ecuador in European Communities–
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27;  DSB Meeting 
Minutes, WT/DSB/M/65 (July 26, 1999), requests by Canada and US in European 
Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),WT/DS48 &  
WT/DS26; DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/94 (Dec. 12, 2000) request by Canada in 
Brazil–Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46; DSB Meeting Minutes, 
WT/DSB/M/149 (May 7, 2003) request by EC in United States–Tax Treatment for Foreign 
Sales (FSC), WT/DS108; DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/145 (May 18, 2003), request by 
Brazil in Canada–Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222; 
DSB Meeting Minutes, WT/DSB/M/180 (Dec. 17, 2004) & WT/DSB/M/178 (Nov. 26, 2004), 
requests by Brazil, EC, India, Japan, Korea, Canada, Mexico and Chile in United States–
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd), WT/ DS217 & WT/DS234.  On 
November 11, 2009, the WTO granted Brazil the right to apply sanctions against US products 
up to $294.7 million annually.  Daniel Pruzin, Brazil Gains WTO OK to Impose Sanctions 
Over U.S. Cotton Subsidies, Weighs IP Rights, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1624 (Nov. 26, 
2009).  This authorization was not included in this article because I only considered decisions 
made through September 2009. 
89 See Daniel Pruzin, Brazil, Canada Agree to Postpone Action On Sanctions Request 
Over Aircraft Subsidy, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1007 (June 6, 2002).   
90 Sanctions have been imposed in the following cases: Arbitration Report, European 
Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB 
(Apr. 9, 1999)(for more information, see Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Issues Final 
List of European Imports To Be Hit With Higher Duties in Banana Row, 16 INT'L TRADE 
REP. (BNA) 621 (Apr. 14, 1999) and Alberto Alemano, European Court Rejects Damages 
Claim from Innocent Bystanders in EU-US "Banana War", 12 ASIL INSIGHTS 21 (Oct. 11, 
2008)); Arbitration Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) (see Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Annouces 
Final List of EU Imports Targeted for Higher Duties in Beef Dispute, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 
(BNA) 1212 (July 21, 1999)); Arbitration Report, United States–Tax Treatment for Foreign 
Sales, WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002) (see Alison Bennet & Katherine M. Stimmel, 
Grassley, Baucus ETI Repeal Legislation Likely to Help Domestic Manufacturers, 20 INT'L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1156 (Aug. 10, 2003) and Joe Kirwin & Alison Bennett, EU Concerned 
Over Grandfather Clause in Export Bill; No Decision Yet, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1714 
(Oct. 21, 2004) and Daniel Pruzin & Alison Bennett, EU Challenges Transition Relief Under 
New Export Tax Legislation, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1825 (Nov. 11, 2004)); Arbitration 
Report, United States–Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/ARB 
(Aug. 31, 2004) (see Daniel Pruzin, EU Reduces by Half U.S. Imports Targeted for Duties in 
Byrd Dispute, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 622 (May 7, 2009) and Rossella Brevetti & 
Michael O'Boyle, EC, Canada Move to Impose Retaliatory Duties in Byrd Dispute, 22 INT'L 
TRADE REP. (BNA) 546 (Apr. 7, 2005) and Michael O'Boyle, Mexico Slaps Punitive Duties 
on U.S. Goods Due to Noncompliance with WTO Byrd Ruling, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 
1386 (Aug. 25, 2005) and Daniel Pruzin, Remaining Complainants Warn of Intent To 
Proceed With Byrd Sanctions by July, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 938 (June 9, 2005)).   
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In December 2009, the EC reached an agreement with the United States and other 
interested Latin American countries, who agreed to terminate WTO adjudication in 
return for Brussels' firm commitment to lower tariffs on banana imports over a period 
of time.92  Due to the implications of this settlement on its parallel commitment to 
African, Caribbean and Pacific ("ACP") banana producing nations, the EC offered 
ACP nations tariff reductions on other tropical imports, a supposedly WTO-compliant 
compromise likely to be included in a final Doha Round grand bargain.93  As of this 
writing, the EC, citing strong public sentiment against removing restrictions on the 
importation of hormone-treated beef,94 has yet to comply with the Hormones 
decision.  However, the EC has reached a side-agreement with the US allowing it to 
maintain current restrictions in exchange for duty-free treatment for hormone-free 
beef.  Under this agreement, the US retains the right to continue suspending 
concessions, which will be gradually phased out in four years.95   
Arguably, it would be unfair to characterize EC conduct in these two instances 
as demonstrative of outright disregard for compliance with international trade law or 
that its leaders care little about its reputation for keeping promises.  Paradoxically, at 
least in the context of the Bananas dispute, EC recalcitrance resulted from caring 
about their reputation for keeping promises of preferential treatment to bananas from 
ACP countries pursuant to another agreement.  Certainly, this agreement was 
adjudicated as noncompliant with WTO law, and the EC took some time to comply.  
Presumably, that was the case because compliance required reconciling two separate, 
competing reputational concerns, EC's commitments to ACP countries and to other 
WTO members.  Thus, recalcitrance occurred not because of EC outright indifference 
to compliance with international commitments, but precisely because it valued one 
more than the other.96  While, arguably, this disaggregated, contextualized view of the 
EC's reputational concerns does not account for EC noncompliance in the one 
remaining case (i.e., Hormones), it suggests that one must proceed with caution 
before making general statements about noncompliance, especially when one views 
its rare occurrence as a major problem.  Either way, one, two, four or six cases of 
                                                                                                                                           
91 See Gary G. Yerkey, Dispute Resolution: Compliance Record of WTO Members in 
Dispute Settlement Cases 'Very Good', WTO Reporter (BNA) (May 5, 2008) (stating that the 
United States Congress passed legislation in 2004-05 to repeal all acts which were 
inconsistent with WTO rulings).   
92
 Daniel Pruzin, Agriculture: EU, Latin, U.S. Officials Welcome Beginning of End to 
WTO Dispute on Banana Imports, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1733 (Dec. 17, 2009).   
93 Id.   
94 Davey, supra note 25 at 33. 
95
 Gary G. Yerkey and Daniel Pruzin, Agriculture: U.S. Farm Group Disappointed with 
Deal to Expand Hormone-Free Beef Sales to EU, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 643 (May 14, 
2009); Gary G. Yerkey, Agriculture: U.S., EU Announce Provisional Deal in Long-Running 
Dispute Over Beef Trade, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 611 (May 7, 2009). 
96 For a similar argument in support of a nuanced, disaggregated view of reputation and 
noncompliance, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27 at 102-04.   
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recalcitrance do not negate the overwhelming record of compliance.  After all 
litigation is done, erstwhile Complainants overwhelmingly obtain what they won in 
substantive adjudication.   
III. Reassessing the Role of Noncompliance 
A. Legalist and Pragmatist Views on Noncompliance 
As in the GATT years, the prospect of occasional noncompliance with dispute 
settlement decisions has inspired debate about the proper level of sanctions in 
international trade law.  Legalists still interpret noncompliance as threat to the trade 
system because, presumably, it allows protectionism to go unchecked.  They do 
recognize "the overall good record" of compliance is primarily due "to the good faith 
desire of WTO members to see the dispute settlement system work effectively."97  
The remedy, they suggest, is more detailed substantive and procedural rules,98 further 
strengthening adjudication outcomes by allowing multilateral sanctions,99 and 
generally a broader, more diversified array of sanctions.100   
More pragmatically inclined scholars argue that further judicialization and 
strengthening sanctions are unlikely to work because enforcement would still depend 
on the will of states, not third-party adjudicators bereft of autonomous agency 
powers.101  Pragmatists believe members themselves might not be so keen on stronger 
sanctions and multilateral enforcement.  Some of them believe harsher enforcement 
rules might cause members to step back on enforcement because they would want to 
"retain the flexibility to raise trade barriers when protectionist pressures surge."102  
Others, still within this pragmatist group, might argue that members would stay their 
hand under harsher rules not because they might engage in protectionism, but because 
they might want to exercise the discretion they retained under the agreements in the 
pursuit of legitimate trade restrictive measures more suited to their societies, with less 
fear of exposure to tougher sanctions should the system rule against them.103   
Furthermore, if members embraced collective sanctions, the proposed reforms 
would have a perverse result, which legalists may not have fully thought through.  
                                                 
97 Davey, supra note 78 at 125. 
98 See Davey, supra note 4 at 117-22. 
99 See Pauwelyn, supra note 4 at 345. 
100 See id. at 344-46; Davey, supra note 78 at 122-26; Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in 
the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 763, 795-808 
(2000). 
101 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27 at 161-62.   
102 See id. at 162.   
103 Unfortunately, the possibility that members might resort to trade restrictive measures 
for reasons other than protectionism, as in the pursuit of legitimate policy concerns (e.g., 
adopting stricter health standards, protecting natural resources, etc.) has not been sufficiently 
considered in the literature.  But see Colares, supra note 2 at 438 and Rodrik, supra note 62 at 
199. 
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Under a multilateral sanction regime, third-party state protectionists would be the 
only group to gain from suspending concessions against the "scofflaw" state, as 
export groups in enforcing states "would be indifferent to any sanctioning strategy 
because they would not have been affected by the trade-inconsistent measure."104  In 
fact, should third-party states with weak protectionist constituencies choose 
retaliation as a bargaining strategy to secure trade concessions from the scofflaw 
state, they would not succeed.  Under collective sanctions, any settlement offer would 
have to be extended to all members (by operation of the MFN principle), whose cost 
would be no different than the cost of retaliation.105  Finally, even in the unlikely 
event that overall transaction and settlement costs did not equal the cost of retaliation, 
the proliferation of PTAs would itself be an unwelcome result in a multilateral 
system.   
In fairness, legalists do not focus only on instances of noncompliance and how 
to remedy them.  Their reform proposals also target timeliness of compliance as a 
problem, since delayed implementation can be a viable tactic until (and if) retaliation 
is authorized.  Davey, for instance, proposes speeding up the entire litigation system, 
especially compliance deadlines, as he perceives them to be excessively generous.106  
He regrets that the prospective nature of WTO remedies provides little incentive for 
offending members to comply within the fifteen-month maximum "reasonable 
compliance" period.107  He proposes not only shortening this to "six or nine months," 
but also starting the clock for compliance prior to the last day of such period, for 
example, on the "date of adoption of the relevant report or date of panel establishment 
or even earlier."108  Mavroidis even suggests allowing erstwhile Complainants to 
request suspension of concessions prior to a formal decision on an Article 21(5) 
Review,109 which, at present, must be decided before suspension requests can be 
adjudicated.110  He argues that combining such requests in one proceeding would go a 
long way towards reducing offending members' ability to further delay compliance by 
extending litigation.111 
While generous deadlines and procedural avenues may be abused, they do 
exist for particularly instrumental reasons.  In the absence of a veto, they give 
members time and flexibility to adjust their practices while considering alternatives to 
offending policies, even avoiding noncompliance altogether.  Making the WTO 
system more legalistic in the direction Davey and Mavroidis propose would 
accelerate the arrival of the retaliation stage and put the system under more stress.  
                                                 
104 See Nzelibe, supra note 79 at 335-36. 
105 See id. at 336. 
106 See Davey, supra note 4 at 117-22.  
107 DSU at art. 21(3)(c).   
108 See Davey, supra note 4 at 121, 126.  
109 Mavroidis, supra note 100 at 795. 
110 See DSU, at art. 22(2). 
111 Mavroidis, supra note 100 at 795. 
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With less time for internal deliberations, some powerful offending members might 
choose to absorb the cost of retaliation and remain noncompliant.  Meanwhile, less 
powerful members would be facing quite asymmetric incentives: as winners, they 
might hesitate to sanction the powerful; as losers they will have less time to comply 
or be ready to face sanctions.  Moreover, this could further encourage bilateralism 
and trade displacement by pushing members to negotiate PTAs, as these can replace 
formerly illegal barriers with WTO-compliant barriers, without improving efficiency.  
Such developments would severely undermine good faith among members, 
potentially causing the multilateral system to unravel.  In sum, by making the system 
too brittle, further legalization of international trade risks too much.   
In fact, even assuming trade diplomats, succumbing to legal 
process/constructivist influences,112 convinced themselves that further judicialization 
and stricter rules and deadlines would benefit all, it would hardly follow that the 
states they represent would subsequently abide by these reforms.  That trade 
negotiators might lean toward greater normativity at one point does not imply that 
they will continue to do so later when domestic interests are directly at stake, as in the 
end of litigation.  In its simplest form, the compliance "problem"—as the original 
substantive violations that create it in the first place—occurs due to a mismatch 
between a member's WTO commitments and either prevailing domestic political 
economic interests or deeply held social values that must be politically tended to.  
Such mismatches may develop and even intensify overtime.  As Trachtman suggests, 
the prevailing political constituencies backing entry into an agreement at one point 
may either change with time or, even if they remain in control, might undergo 
preference shifts as circumstances change.113  Because compliance seems to depend 
"on the constellation of domestic political forces in the relevant state,"114 at a given 
point in time, the possibility of retaliation and reputational loss, by itself, cannot exact 
compliance.  Thus, it is more likely that the relative influence of trade-restricting and 
anti-sanction groups, not external forces or "internationalist" trade diplomats, 
determines whether compliance will occur.115  It is true that harsher enforcement rules 
give more leverage to the anti-sanction camp, yet they may still not prevail if the 
losing member is persuaded by the other camp that it cannot compromise on an issue 
deemed to be of "great national importance."116   
                                                 
112 See Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975, 
981 (2005) (arguing that, overtime government officials from different states, influenced by 
their interactions with international institutions and each other, may undergo a switch in 
preferences that will favor greater norm internalization over their own states' more parochial 
interests.).   
113 See Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The 
Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law 1, 11 (Apr. 18, 2010) available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1549337.   
114 See id. at 21.   
115 Answering this empirical question would be beyond the scope of this article.   
116 See Guzman, supra note 64 at 321.  
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B. The Role and Merits of Noncompliance 
Legalists believe that increasing the sanctions for breach of WTO obligations 
would increase the commitment level of WTO members.  This generally assumes that 
the existing sanction (i.e., suspension of concessions following bilateral substantive 
and compliance litigation) is somehow suboptimal.  The discussion above (Part III.A) 
suggests why that is not the case.  Indeed, members, whose actions are often the 
product of considered calculations reflecting domestic interests, might not be so keen 
on a more severe enforcement system that would limit the remaining flexibility they 
have in trade policy, especially in light of the consistent record of Complainant wins 
in WTO adjudication.  In a way, it is as if legalists were arguing from the perspective 
of a dissatisfied adjudicator, in whose institutional view a few instances of less than 
full compliance are ipso facto proof that compliance incentives are less than adequate.  
While it would be unfair to characterize legalists as essentially making the same 
"strengthening the system" arguments WTO adjudicators and Secretariat staff are 
likely to endorse, it is unquestionable that the reforms they propose would lead to yet 
more judicialization and transfer of authority from members to adjudicators, with 
potentially disastrous results.    
More plausibly, legalists make these arguments because they overemphasize 
the adjudicative dimension of the WTO system while underestimating its far more 
important political dimensions, international and domestic.  They generally fail to see 
that adjudication, as a generally egalitarian mode of interaction, is, in principle, 
unresponsive to the logic of power and the implications resulting from power 
asymmetries.  True, WTO litigants are equal before the law and play by rules of 
engagement that, at least as far as courtroom activity is concerned, "do not permit 
them to deploy all their resources in the conflict, but require that they proceed within 
the limiting forms" of adjudication.117  Yet, when the assumption of adjudicative 
equality clashes (outside the courtroom) with the reality of power as it expresses itself 
in outright noncompliance or delayed compliance—the US and the EC are the only 
members to have endured sanctions while not complying—legalists react by 
proposing reforms that would make the system more like domestic adjudication, 
where enforcement is presumed optimal.118  In doing so, they rarely give full 
consideration to the political and systemic repercussions of their presumably 
apolitical reforms.  Obviously, the DSB system is not merely about adjudication.  In 
fact, a more nuanced political view of the DSB's judicial function counsels against 
not only shifting members' rights and obligations "in a systematic way [that] would 
contradict the delicate political balancing act that characterizes multilateral trade 
negotiations,"119 as has happened in substantive adjudication, but also any further 
                                                 
117 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 135 (1974). 
118 Davey recognizes that "most long-term non-compliance has occurred in disputes 
between developed countries," but does not investigate further why that might be the case.  
See Davey, supra note 78 at 123 n. 30.   
119 Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, 
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 250 (2004).   
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restraints on their ability to cope with and adapt to the effects of DSB decisions, as 
legalists now propose.   
Having won the earlier Uruguay Round battle that led to more judicialized 
proceedings and clearer sanctions over GATT's looser framework, where states could 
openly negotiate on a case-by-case basis and even block the adoption of decisions,120 
legalists seem to be pressing their case too hard this time.  First, in light of the 
evidence presented in Part II.B.3 & 4, outright noncompliance is rare and mostly 
reflects situations where powerful nations have faced complex choices as they 
attempt to balance domestic pressures against important policy considerations 
(Hormones, FSC and Byrd) or competing multilateral concerns (Bananas).  Similarly, 
rather than abuse of process, instances of delay followed by compliance might be 
viewed more generously, allowing the possibility of sanctions and the passage of time 
to work together.  Second, as discussed in Part III.A, shorter deadlines and steeper 
sanctions will not strengthen the system's normativity if third-party adjudicators, 
lacking the power of agency, have to rely on members' enforcement capabilities, who 
themselves face asymmetric incentives to comply and punish.  Indeed, one (bilateral) 
version of this harsher enforcement regime might even lead to a hard-to-reverse spiral 
toward bilateralism, as members scramble to evade sanctions by negotiating PTAs 
that displace more efficient producers, undermining good faith among members and 
demoralizing those in favor of multilateralism.  A multilateral or collective sanction 
system would fare no better.   
Finally, with the advent of the DSU, members signed away the possibility of 
blocking enforcement by adopting the reverse consensus rule.  A triumph of legalism, 
no doubt, this implies that, in politically sensitive disputes, members now have fewer 
options when facing adverse outcomes.  In such a system, members' valuation of time 
undergoes a profound change.  Specifically, after a period of violation and subsequent 
litigation, a protracted return to compliance might become the next best alternative, as 
the passage of time might be sufficient to appease prevailing trade-restricting 
constituencies.121  In fact, time becomes even more important to the non-cynical 
violator who, genuinely believing no violation was committed, will attempt to 
mitigate the effects of an adverse decision by either delaying compliance, not 
complying and submitting to sanctions or proposing concessions in other areas.122  If 
one recalls that the veto's abrogation was part and parcel of a move toward increased 
judicialization of the world trade system, which replaced regular diplomatic 
negotiations with a permanent Appellate Body and continuously evolving trade 
jurisprudence, one may plausibly argue that recalcitrance and low levels of 
                                                 
120 See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 94-96 
(1987). 
121 Goldsmith and Posner make a similar argument to explain members' return to 
compliance.  See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 27 at 157.   
122 See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Reaches Agreement with EU at WTO on Compensation 
for Internet Gambling, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1788 (Dec. 20, 2007) (quoting Gretchen 
Hamel, Spokeswoman for the Office of the US Trade Representative, stating that "the 
binding commitments will be extended to all WTO members.").   
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noncompliance might play an inevitable, even necessary "cushioning" role in the 
system.   
Conclusion 
International trade law scholars have demonstrably different views on 
compliance and enforcement of legal obligations.  One of the important research 
questions in the field, a point in which scholars have marked disagreement, pertains 
to the desirability of further reforms to strengthen compliance.  This article considers 
their different arguments in succession and attempts to integrate into this debate 
insights derived from prior empirical studies on substantive adjudication, adding a 
new empirical analysis of compliance adjudication.  These analyses show that 
Complainants' systematic high rates of success in substantive adjudication can be 
attributed to WTO adjudicators' adoption of a liberal view of free trade that furthers 
the interests Complainants typically represent at that stage, but that the latter only 
attain a similar degree of success in compliance litigation when they continue to act 
on behalf of pro-free trade interests.  For example, erstwhile Complainants win only 
one in three level-of-retaliation disputes; i.e., disputes where they are pursuing trade 
restrictions as the final punishment for noncompliance.   
Viewed in combination, these modes of litigation reveal an adjudicatory 
system operating with high consistency, yet exhibiting favoritism toward a particular 
teleological view of free trade, expressed not in favor of the litigant who originally 
defended it, but in favor of whoever argues for it in any given instance.  In light of the 
way the system has operated, with members' reserved regulatory discretion under 
continuous attack from a jurisprudence bent on furthering a liberal view of trade, it is 
remarkable that compliance levels have remained high, despite members' occasional, 
strong criticism.123  That few architects of increased legalization "contemplated the 
possibility that in interpreting WTO agreements, the [AB] would engage in expansive 
lawmaking"124—a view that, in hindsight, seems a bit naïve—should cause scholars 
to be a bit more cautious when considering yet more rigidifying reforms.  In fact, the 
remaining alternatives for coping with the way the DSB system has operated may be 
viewed, in a sense, as the new veto.  Simply put, reforming the system to make it yet 
more "legalistic" would be unwarranted, as such proposals would make it too rigid 
and unaccommodating and might push its more powerful members toward outright 
bilateralism, eventually causing it to collapse.  In fact, compliance is the least of the 
system's problems.   
                                                 
123 See Dunoff, supra note 25 at 353 (discussing US proposals "to increase party control 
over the dispute settlement process," and US and Chile's arguments for "the desirability of 
providing 'additional guidance to WTO adjudicative bodies,' including with respect to the 
rules of interpretation of the WTO agreements, and ensuring that panel members have 
appropriate expertise.") (quoting Textual Contribution by Chile and the United States (14 
March 2003) TN/DS/W/52.)  
124 Steinberg, supra note 119 at 251 n. 27 (citing telephone interview with A. Jane 
Bradley, former Assistant US Trade Representative for Monitoring and Enforcement and US 
Representative to the Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement Negotiations).   
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Authorized Suspension of Concessions from January 1, 1995 through September 30, 2009 
 
 
Dispute and Date Initiated 
Report of the  
Arbitrator 





1(a). European Communities – 
Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas 
 
Jan. 14, 1999  
09.04.99 
WT/DS27/ARB 
Pursuant to the US request 
(WT/DS27/49) authorization 
was granted at the DSB 
meeting on 19.04.99  
(WT/DSB/M/59) 
Up to $191.4 
million per year 
1(b). European Communities – 
Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas  




Pursuant to Ecuador's request  
(WT/DS27/54) authorization 
was granted at the DSB 
meeting on 18.05.00  
(WT/DSB/M/80) 
~ 
2. European Communities – 
Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products 
(Hormones)  




Pursuant to the US request 
(WT/DS26/21)  
and Canada's request 
(WT/DS48/19) 
authorization was granted at 
the DSB meeting on 26.07.99  
(WT/DSB/M/65) 
$116.8 million per 
year 
3. Brazil – Export Financing 
Programme for Aircraft  




Pursuant to Canada's request 
(WT/DS46/25) 
authorization was granted at 
the DSB meeting on 12.12.00 
(WT/DSB/M/94) 
~ 
4. United States – Tax 
Treatment for "Foreign 
Sales Corporations"  
Nov. 17, 2000 
30.08.02 
WT/DS108/ARB 
Pursuant to the EC's request 
(WT/DS108/26) 
authorization was granted at 
the DSB meeting on 07.05.03 
(WT/DSB/M/149) 
$4.043 billion per 
year 
                                                 
125 See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, Annual Overview, Annual Report 
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Dispute and Date Initiated 
Report of the  
Arbitrator 





5. Canada – Export Credits 
and Loan Guarantees for 
Regional Aircraft  
May 23, 2002 
17.02.03 
WT/DS222/ARB 
Pursuant to Brazil's request 
(WT/DS222/10) 
authorization was granted at 




6. United States – Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000  


















Pursuant to the requests by 
Brazil (WT/DS217/38); 
 the EC (WT/DS217/39); 
 India (WT/DS217/40); 
 Japan (WT/DS217/41); 
 Korea (WT/DS217/42); 
 Canada (WT/DS234/31); 
 Mexico (WT/DS234/32), 
 authorization was granted at 
the DSB meeting on 26.11.04 
(WT/DSB/M/178) 
 
Pursuant to the request by 
Chile (WT/DS217/43) 
authorization was granted at 
the DSB meeting on 17.12.04 
(WT/DSB/M/180) 




million per year 
 
